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THE CAUSES AND RESULTS OF OUR WAR
WITH, SPAIN FROM A LEGAL STAND-
POINT.
In considering' some of the legal questions relating to the
cause and results of the recent war with Spain, I shall assume
the facts to be as stated by Presidert McKinley in his message
to Congress, of date April 1i, 1898. Without consuming time in
detailed quotations from the message, it is sufficient for the
present purpose to call attention, in a general way, to the main
facts pointed out.
Spain was engaged, and had been for a long time, in the
effort to subdue her rebellious subjects in Cuba. At first the
contest was conducted with reasonable regard for the require-
ments of civilized war. Finding herself unable to subdue the
rebellion in this legitimate way, Spain finally resorted to the
unwarranted extreme of herding non-combatants, aged tillers
of the soil, women and children, within the confines of towns,
or their immediate vicinage, and there subjecting them to such
treatment that great misery, starvation and death necessarily
resulted. Out of three hundred thousand of the agricultural
population so confined, at least fifty per cent. met their expected
doom, and the balance were left in a state of physical and
mental dwarfage destined to materially affect them and their
posterity forever. Whatever may have .been the declared or
ostensible purpose of this cruel and unusual war measure, we
may safely charge that the real purpose was to starve out of
existence the revolutionary stock, and with it a revolution
which Spain had been unable to suppress by legitimate war-
fare.
Again, according to the facts stated by the President with
much detail, our material interests and national safety were
seriously affected by a continuation of the war. He says, in
substance, that the lives, liberty and property of our citizens
were in constant danger, and that the continuance of the war
was a constant menace to our peace. "While both the President,
in his proclamation, and Congress, in its act, declaring war,
alluded to the destruction of the "Maine" as one of the facts in
the case, neither of them claimed that it, under the circum-
stances of uncertainty and doubt existing at the time concern-
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ing its cause, had then developed into a sufficient justification
for the declaration of war.
The war must, therefore, stand for its justification on the
ground of humanity and Christian civilization, and on the other
ground of injury and danger to our material interests and
national welfare. Or, as President McKinley tersely expressed
it, "In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, on
behalf of endangered American interests, * * * the war in
Cuba must stop."
Upon one or both of these grounds must our conduct in
declaring war with Spain be vindicated when impartial history
deals with it. Can it stand the test? In my opinion, yes, and
for the following reasons.
We are here to-day the greatest and best exponent of con-
stitutional self-government in the world.
We believe that such a government is the only one under
which civil liberty and the freedom of the individual can
thrive. We believe that Absolutism in any form is derogatory
to man's welfare, whether considered as an individual, or as a
member of society. When, therefore, the people of any country
are striving to throw off the yoke of tyranny, it well becomes
our duty to extend to them, so far as -we may do so, consistent
with our national policy, and consistent with principles of
international law-such sympathy and aid as lies in our power.
We have a national policy generally known as the Monroe
Doctrine. While I do not intend to invoke this doctrine as, in
itself, a justification of the war, I believe that it had largely to
do with bringing the island of Cuba into that condition which
justified, if indeed it did not in honor require, our intervention,
to protect Spanish subjects from the weak and degenerate gov-
ernment which such policy had largely conduced to bring
about. That doctrine, so heroically asserted by us in the case
of the Venezuela boundary line, means, in its broad and compre-
hensive sense, that this hemisphere is dedicated to liberty. It
expressly denounces colonization here by European powers,
or the extension of their systems here.
By reason of the adoption and enforcement of the Monroe
Doctrine as a settled policy of this government, as might be
reasonably expected, the entire western hemisphere has been
practically converted to the principles of liberty and constitu-
tional government. Witness the fact that in all South and
Central America there is scarcely a vestige left of colonial rela-
tionship to any monarchical government. Republics, founded
in the main after that of the United States, have taken their
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places. At the breaking out of the last Cuban rebellion, the
island of Cuba (with Porto Rico) was substantially all that
Spain had left of her once magnificent and extensive colo-
nial possessions in North and South America. Her govern-
ment and sway over Cuba, conforming to the natural law of
decay incident to repressed and unexpanding institutions of
every kind, had become weak and powerless. Many of her sub-
jects were in a constant state of revolt. She could not enforce
her laws, sustain life, preserve property, or satisfactorily dis-
charge any of the great functions of government.
She had been engaged in a relentless warfare with these
subjects for the period of three years, to say nothing of the
preceding rebellions, and in her vain and frenzied effort to
pacify them she finally, under the pretext of a war measure,
reached the acme of cruelty already alluded to-starvation of
non-combatants. "This," the President says, "was not civilized
warfare. The only peace it could beget was. that of the wilder-
ness and the grave." In this state of things Spain's desperate
subjects appealed to us. They claimed to desire, and claimed
they were fit for, self-government. Here we stood, a nation
professing to be a Christian nation, observant of the laws and
practices of Christian warfare, and claiming to dominate this
continent with our principles of freedom, liberty and repre-
sentative government. This distressed people was practically
at our threshold, and much nearer to us in point of distance
than to any other strong power of the earth.
This simple statement of the case seems to me to demand
instantaneous judgment in favor of intervention on our part on
the grounds of humanity alone; and this certainly will be the
case unless inflexible rules of international law forbid.
International law may be comprehensively defined to be a
system of principles recognized by the Christian nations of the
earth in governing their intercourse with each other, and in the
treatment of each other's subjects, conformable to principles of
natural justice. There is no international tribunal or board for
administering this law. It depends for its sanction chiefly upon
a strong moral sentiment, disposed to conform to that standard
of right which Christian nations voluntarily recognize. As a
last resort, war is the final arbiter. Can the Christian nations
of the earth reasonably say that the United States, in putting
an end to a- war at our very threshold, conducted on barbarous
methods, inflicting in this year of Grace, x898, medieval barbar-
ities and cruelties upon her subjects-violated natural rights or
justice? If not, such act on our part was not violative of any
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principle of international law. In discussing this feature of the
subject, I am free to admit that, as a general rule of international
law, "no government is authorized to render assistance to prov-
inces or colonies in revolt against the established goyernment,"
Woolsey on International Law, Sec. 42. This rule, I submit, can-
not be the dictate of the law of Christian nations, when the
established government violates all Christian principles, and
resorts to a barbarous, cruel and unusual mode of warfare, such
as that resorted to by Spain against her revolting subjects. So
manifestly is this the case, that among the several exceptions
to the general rule alluded to, writers on international law admit
that when "some extraordinary state of things is brought
about by the crime of the government against its subjects,"
other nations are justified in interfering on their behalf. Spain's
treatment of her non-combatant subjects was a crime; unwar-
ranted by the rules of civilized warfare, and violative of the
principles of natural justice.
I therefore believe that impartial history will justify our
armed intervention to suppress -the Cuban war, on the broad
ground that the dictates of Christian civilization and humanity
demanded it of us.
For another reason, also, our intervention was justifiable.
Every nation of the earth has the undoubted right, incident to
sovereignty, to protect itself. We need not look to constitu-
tions, enabling acts, or written expressions of international law
for authority to protect ourselves against a condition of things
which in the language of the President, "had become intoler-
able." The long continued menace to the lives and liberties of
our people, the destruction of our property, the injury to our
commerce, and last, but not least, the destruction of the "Maine "
in the harbor of Havana, with its full complement of officers
and men, whether intentional or unintentional on the part of
the Spanish authorities-presented a condition of things dan-
gerous to our peace and destructive to our interests. It was
high time for our government to assert its sovereign right to
protect itself, and, in my opinion, for this reason also, no prin-
ciple of right, no standard of international law, and no just
obligations toward Spain were violated by the declaration of
war on our part.
I have, in what has already been said, stated the grounds of
our justification in waging war with Spain, in rather of a sum-
mary way, without stoppin-to quote authority or precedent, in
order that I may devote more time and attention to the inter.
esting and vital questions connected with the termination of
the war.
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Within less than four months after the declaration of war, as
a result of one of the most heroic, aggressive and successful
campaigns by land and sea which the world has evei witnessed,
Spain was compelled to sue for peace, and on August 12, 1898,
caused to be signed in her behalf a-provisional agreement,
commonly called a protocol, by which she agreed to relinquish,
without reservation, all claim of sovereignty and title to Cuba
(and thus was accomplished the entire purpose for which the
war was begun). She also agreed to cede to the United States,
Porto Rico and one or two other small islands of the West In-
dies over which she exercised sovereignty, together with one
island in the Ladrones group, in the Pacific, to be selected by
the United States. She also turned over the possession of the
city, harbor and bay of Manilla in the Philippines group, to be
held by the United States pending the conclusion of a treaty of
peace which is to determine the control, disposition and govern-
ment of the entire Philippines group.
By virtue of the foregoing, we find ourselves practically in
possession of the situation; with Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philip-
pines, and a part or all of the Ladrones, subject to our disposi-
tion. Commissioners appointed by the United States and Spain
are now in session, nominally to agree upon a treaty of peace
and determine the extent of our acquisitions, but really to for-
mulate the demands of the United States with respect thereto.
Their determinations must soon be subject to the consideration
and approval of the United States Senate. What should be the
character and extent of these demands ?
The Constitution of the United States, the great chart under
which we have so long safely sailed, and under which we must
continue our voyage so long as we desire to be a free people,
dedicated to the principles of civil liberty and constitutional
government, contains but two provisions at all applicable to the
present situation.
First: 'Section III, Article 4, ordains as follows: "The Con-
gress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other pro-perty be-
longing to the United States."
Second: The same section and article ordains as follows:
"New states may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union."
The first provision above referred to, history informs us,
was made with special reference to the government and dis-
position of the great northwest territory, consisting of that
portion of territory ceded by Great Britain, or, more accurately
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speaking, acknowledged by Great Britain to be the property of
the United States by the Treaty of Paris of September 3, 1783.
This territory lies west of the western boundaries of the thir-
teen original states, south of the Great Lakes and east of the
Mississippi river, and was ceded to the United States prior to
the adoption of our Federal Constitution by the several states
to which it belonged under Royal Charters. The Supreme
Court of the United States has said that this provision confer-
ring upon Congress power to'make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting the territory of the United States relates exclu-
sively to that northwest territory, which was then the subject-
matter of consideration, and has no application to other terri-
tory subsequently acquired. Such construction was put upon
this provision in an elaborate and exhaustive consideration of
it in the famous Dred Scott case, 19 Howard 393. I have re-
ferred to this provision and called attention to the construction
placed upon it by the Supreme Court, because of the claim
made by publicists whose articles I have recently read, that it
confers direct constitutional power upon Congress to govern
any part of the territory which the United States may acquire
according to its own will, with no limitations thereon whatso-
ever; and this provision has been especially referred to as con-
ferring the right to govern such territory as a colony or de-
pendency, such as the Crown Colonies of Great Britain.
--- In the light of this decision, holding that Congress derives
no power from this provision of the Constitution to govern any
of the newly acquired territory, we must look to that other pro-
vision of the Constitution already quoted, conferring upon Con-
gress the power to admit new states into the Union, for
authority to deal with or govern such territory as we may
ultimately become possessed of.
Even if for the sake of argument it should be admitted that
the provision of the Constitution conferring power upon Con-
gress to make needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory of the United States could apply to any of our newly
acquired territory, it is clear that such provision must be read
in connection with the other provision referred to. The two
taken together conclusively show that no unlimited power was
conferred upon Congress in this respect. The power to make
needful rules and regulations is to be exercised sub mode, that is
to say, in the light of the purpose to be subserved by the exer-
cise of the power, and that is, to fit the newly acquired terri-
tory for admission into the Union as states. It is thus seen
that whether the power to govern territory is directly con-
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ferred by the constitutional provision referred to, or is to be
implied from the power conferred to admit new states into the
Union, is practically immaterial. The result is the same. The
government provided for must be such as is adapted to sub-
serve the only purpose contemplated by the Constitution pro-
viding for it.
At the time of the acquisition of the great Louisiana terri-
tory, in x803, it was strenuously debated by many statesmen
that there was no power lodged in the government, by the
Constitution or elsewhere, to enlarge the territory of the
United States by new acquisitions. Without special reference
to the vigorous debates on this subject, it is sufficient to say
that such contention has long ago been settled, and such power,
namely, the power to acquire additional territory, is now fully
recognized by the legislative, executive and judicial depart-
ments of the government.
It may not be inappropriate, however, to call attention, in a
general way, to the source of this power: First, all powers
expressly conferred by the Constitution necessarily include
any and all other powers requisite for their efficient exercise,
hence the continuing power lodged in Congress to admit new
states into the Union necessarily implies the power to acquire
new territory out of which to make them. Again, the power
to acquire territory may be implied from the power expressly
conferred upon Congress and the executive to make war and
conclude treaties. In concluding peace with nations with
which we have been at war, oftentimes the necessity exists, as
in the case with Spain at the present day, of taking territory
as an indemnity against the cost of war, in lieu of money.
This power, in a limited degree, may also arise from and exist
as a right incident to sovereignty, implied from the necessity
of maintaining and defending national existence. This neces-
sity is ordinarily satisfied by the taking of coaling stations,
naval supply stations and the like.
From whatever source the power to acquire territory is
derived, it is clear that it exists in the national government,
and may be exercised according to the wise discretion of the
executive and legislative departments. It is also perfectly
clear that the acquisition of new territory, for whatever reason,
can have but one legitimate object and purpose in view, and
that is, to secure territory for ultimate statehood. And there
can be but one general character of government devised for
such territory, and that is, a government adapted to fit its
inhabitants for statehood. In other words, under the Constitu-
3
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tion of the United States, as it now stands, statehood is the
ultimate destiny of all territory belonging, or which may
belong, to this nation. The reasons for this doctrine, as well as
the doctrine itself, are so clearly and tersely expressed in the
opinion of the court in the great Dred Scott case, that I shall
take the liberty of quoting somewhat at length therefrom. The
court, amongst other things, says: "This brings us to examine
by what provision of the Constitution the present federal
government, under its delegated and restricted powers, is
authorized to acquire territory outside of the original limits of
the United States. * * * There is certainly no power given
by the Constitution to the federal government to establish or
maintain colonies bordering on the United States, or at a dis-
tance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, nor to
enlarge its territorial limits in any way except by the admis-
sion of new states. * * * No power is given to acquire ter-
ritory to be held and governed permanently in that character"
(that is, as a dependent colony). * * * "The power to
expand the territory of the United States is plainly given, and
in the construction of this power by all the departments of gov-
ernment, it has been held to authorize the acquisition of terri-
tory not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted as
soon as its population and situation entitle it to admission. It
is acquired to become a state and not to be held as a colony and
governed by Congress with absolute authority; and as the pro-
priety of admitting new states is committed to the sound dis-
cretion of Congress, the power to acquire territory for that
purpose to be held by the United States until it is in a suit-
able condition to become a state, upon equal footing with the
other states, must rest upon the same discretion. * * * A
power, therefore, in the general government, to obtain and hold
colonies and dependent territories over which it might legislate
without restriction, would be inconsistent with its own existence
in its present form. Whatever it acquires it acquires for the
benefit of the people of the several states who created it. It is
their trustee acting for them and charged with the duty of pro-
moting the interests of the whole people of the Union in the
exercise of the powers specifically granted. At the time when
the territory in question (which was the Louisiana Purchase)
was obtained by cession from France, it had no population fit to
be associated together and admitted as a state, and it therefore
was absolutely necessary to hold possession of it as a territory
belonging to the United States, until it was settled and inhab-
ited by a civilized community, capable of self-government and in
RESULTS OF OUR WAR WITH SPAIN.
a condition to be admitted on equal terms with the other
states as a member of the Union. But until that time arrives
it is undoubtedly necessary that some government should
be established in order to organize society and to protect
the inhabitants in their person and property, and to gather
there a population which would enable it to assume the
position to which it was destined among the states of the
Union."
My attention has been called to several decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, notably to the cases of
National Bank v. Yankton, ioi U. S. 129; Murphy v. Ramsey, r14
U. S. 15; Mormon Church v. U. S., r36 U. S.; and Insurance Co.
v. Canter, i Peters Si, and other cases, which hold, in effect,
that Congress has plenary power over territory belonging to
the United States, and may legislate directly for its govern-
ment, and from such power, which is unquestionable, the argu-
ment is indulged by some writers that Congress may acquire
territory with the predetermination of governing it despoti-
cally, and may afterwards hold and govern it indefinitely and
perpetually as a colony, with no reference to, or purpose for,
ultimate statehood. With all due respect for the opinion of
such writers, I confidently assert that there is no substantial
authority for such doctrine. As already seen, Congress is given
the power to prescribe a government, and such a government
as in its -wisdom, honesty and discretion, seems best for such
territory. But in the conference of this power Congress was
made a trustee, to inaugurate and maintain such a government
over any. newly acquired territory as to fit it for its ultimate
destiny as a state of the Union, and I find no authority in the
cases cited, or elsewhere, questioning this fundamental doctrine
laid down so ably in the case from which I have quoted. This
doctrine isreiterated in 1893, in thecase of Shivelyv. Bowlby, 152
U. S. (i). In this case Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of
the Supreme Court, amongst other things, says: "And the ter-
ritories acquired by Congress, whether by deed or cession from
the original states, or by treaty with foreign countries, are
held with the object, as soon as their population and condition jus-
tified, of being admitted into the Union of states upon an equal
footing with the original states, in all respects:" It is a scan-
dalous argument to say that, because Congress has power to
inaugurate such a. system of g6vernment for newly acquired
territory as to it seems best to accomplish a certain purpose,
that it will inaugurate any government not calculated to sub-
serve that purpose.
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Judging from history and from the past treatment of new
territory, no such dishonesty or breach of trust can fairly be
imputed to Congress. In all cases the form of government
devised for any newly acquired territory has been in the line of
self-government. The people have been allowed to enact their
own laws; provide for and collect taxes for their own govern-
ment; establish inferior courts and determine their jurisdic-
tion and duties, and, in a general way, to conduct their own
affairs.
The ordinance for the government of the Northwest terri-
tory of July 13, 1787, was the first provision of Congress on this
subject. A perusal of this ordinance shows that it contains
many of the great and salutary principles of Magna Charta and
the Declaration of Independence. In addition to these, it con-
tains provision for a legislative assembly as soon as 5,ooo free
male inhabitants are found in the district. And such, in a gen-
eral way, have been the provisions made for government of all
the territory hitherto acquired by the United States. In fact,
as early as March 2, 1805, a government containing many of the
elements of local representative government was organized for
the territory of Orleans, which was acquired as a part of the
great Louisiana Purchase by treaty with France in 1803. The
balance of that extensive territory was kept under the sole leg-
islative supervision and control of Congress for a little while
longer; only, however, until June 4, 1812, when an act was
passed by Congress giving to the remaining portion of that
purchase the same character of local self-government. But I
may be asked if the case of Alaska is not an exception to this
general rule? It is true that Congress has not, up to the pres-
ent time, authorized the people of that territory to elect a legis-
lative assembly, or otherwise take any action for their own
government.
This territory is still governed by direct legislation of Con-
gress, but there are excellent reasons for the delay in establish-
ing local self-government for it. It is enormous in its area and
so sparsely populated that its inhabitants could scarcely ever
meet together. It has an area of 531,000 square miles, and a
population, according to the last census, of only 32,000, includ-
ing Indians. Of this number only 4,298 are white inhabitants.
This makes only one white inhabitant to about every 125 square
miles of territory. It is thus seen that there are not enough
white inhabitants to fill the necessary offices for governing
such an extensive territory, and certainly there would be no
inhabitants to be governed if these officers could be elected.
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From the foregoing exposition of the constitutional duties
imposed upon Congress, in acquiring and governing new terri-
tory, and from the uniform course of legislation on the part of
Congress concerning the government of such territory, three
propositions seem to be clear:
First: That such territory must be acquired with the pur-
pose and intent of creating out of it new states for our Federal
Union.
Second: That after its acquisition such provisional govern-
ment must, within a reasonable time, be organized over it as
will most effectively conduce to qualification for statehood, and
Third: As a corollary to the foregoing two propositions it
necessarily follows that no territory can be acquired to be
permanently governed by the Congress of the United States as
a dependent colony.
Such being the clear duty cast upon Congress by the Consti-
stution, as interpreted by the highest judicial tribunal of our
nation, it may readily be assumed that in any case where duty
harmonizes with the ambition and interests of men in securing
the honors and emoluments incident to statehood, the ultimate
destiny of any newly acquired territory into statehood will be
realized as rapidly as any of its portions may be found to be, or
may hereafter become, ready for statehood. The disposition of
Congress in the matter of erecting states out of territorial
belongings is familiar to all. A glance at a few recent cases is
sufficient to evince our national policy in this regard.
Nevada was admitted as a state into the Union in 1864 with
a population, according to the census of i86o, of only 6,857.
North Dakota was admitted in 1889 with a population of
about 18o,ooo.
South Dakota was admitted in x889 with a population of
about 325,000.
Montana was admitted in 1889 with population of about
130,000.
Wyoming was admitted in 1889 with a population of about
6o,ooo.
Idaho was admitted in 189o with a population of about
84,000.
Utah was admitted in 1896 with a population, according to
the census of 1890, Of 207,905.
Whether the manifest haste to create states out of our terri-
tory is due to a zealous consideration of the rights and inter-
ests of the people as a whole, or to the ambitions of men, is
unimportant for our present purpose. The fact remains that
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the policy of our government in recent times has been to create
a state out of a given territory as soon as any reasonable prq-
text or excuse can be given for so doing. In view of all these
things, what can we reasonably expect in regard to our new
acquisitions? The laws of Spain as they exist must clearly be
administered, for a time at least, until a new order of things
can be established. The military arm of our government must
enforce these laws, to the end that peace and tranquillity shall
prevail; but manifestly such is but a temporary expedi-
ent. As soon as Congress can give the necessary attention to
it, some permanent system of government must be devised.
While the form and character of such government is left to the
sound discretion of the legislative department, it must be pre-
sumed that Congress will so exercise its discretion as to con-
form to our national principles. We are a government of the
people, by the people and for the people. We are the great ex-
ample and teacher of civil liberty and constitutional self-gov-
ernment. Not only so, but the Congress of the United States
is under a positive obligation, ordained by the Constitution, to
so govern any such territory as to prepare it for statehood. In
addition to this, each and every member of Congress takes a
solemn oath to maintain and defend the Constitution, which
is the Supreme Law of the land. Of course then, in all cases
where there is any considerable population, some form of popu-
lar government will be speedily devised for it. There will be
no taxation without representation. There will be no govern-
ment without the consent of the governed. Assuming that
these fundamental principles and obligations will be observed,
how does the case stand with respect to Porto Rico? By the
provisional agreement already made, she now stands ceded to
the United States. She is an island of 3,500 square miles in
area, or about three-fourths of the size of the state of Connecti-
cut. Her population is at least three-quarters of a million, or
more by nearly one hundred thousand than Connecticut pos-
sesses. She is, in the language of Mr. Story, who has recently
written an article on the subject, "a well established, intelli-
gent, civilized community, whose population is more intelligent
than the majority of mankind." According to reports made to
me by soldiers who have recently come from Porto Rico, her
internal improvements have advanced to a considerable degree
of perfection. One-tenth of her population, at least, are inde-
pendent, self-respecting Spaniards. The balance of her popula-
tion (consisting mainly of creoles and mulattoes) without doubt
is as intelligent a class of people as that which we, in our recon-
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struction policy at the close of the War of the Rebellion,
deemed worthy of elective franchise and capable of self-gov-
ernment. It is true that her civilization is not of the Anglo-
Saxon, liberty-loving kind. Her people are taught in the civil-
ization of the Latin school, but this circumstance will stand as
little in the way of the influence of a few hundred ambitious
Americans who will soon find their way there, as the cowboy
civilization of Wyoming, Nevada and Montana stood in the way
of the ambitious emigrant to those territories. In other words,
taking into consideration all things which bear upon the ques-
tion as already considered, Porto Rico will probably, in a very
few years, become one of the sovereign states of the American
Union, with two august Senators and five or six members of Con-
gress, chosen by her voters to make the laws for our people.
And as for Cuba; pursuant to the magnanimous and unself-
ish policy promulgated to the world at the inception of the war,
she must, nolens volens, be reconstructed into a stable, inde-
pendent government of her own selection. While I believe
that the expression of this purpose was on the part of our
government at the time sincere, and that some government
nominally answering to that description will, within a reason-
able time, be established there, and while we owe our aid in
the matter of organizing a government there to the insurgents
and revolutionists of Cuba, as a just and honorable obligation
to an ally in- the prosecution of the war, yet such a govern-
ment, in the nature of the case, cannot be a permanent one,
and the same considerations which I have already expressed in
relation to Porto Rico, and the example fresh before us of the
acquisition of Texas and Hawaii, which formed independent,
popular governments of their own, and which were shortly
thereafter annexed to the territory of the United States, induces
me to believe that history will repeat itself in the case of Cuba.
Within the lifetime of many of us the Independent Republic
of Cuba, which must of necessity be organized, will be
annexed to the territory of the United States, and the same
inevitable destiny of statehood in the American Republic
awaits her.
But I may be asked if we cannot change our policy, amend
our Constitution and enter upon a new career as -a nation, such
as will permit us to hold dependent colonies and organize a
government for them corresponding to the character and needs
of the people, whether the same are in the line of self-govern-
ment or otherwise; and whether the same be adapted to fit such
people for statehood or not? Of course we can do so.. The will
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of the people, deliberately formed, will find some avenue for its
execution. But how difficult it will be to lawfully bring about
such a change clearly appears, when we consider bow deeply
the notions of freedom and local self-government have been
incorporated into the breasts of our people by the many trying
ordeals and sacrifices which have marked our progress as a
nation from the days of 1776 to the present time. Our national
literature, our orations great and small, our songs, our life, have
drawn their inspiration from the immortal words of the
Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among
these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to
secure these rights governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
And from those no less memorable words of our Constitution:
"We, the People of the United States, in order to establish Jus-
tice * * * and secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, etc., do ordain and establish this Constitution of
the United States of America."
It will be no easy task, when the proposition of the imperial-
ists or expansionists to establish a system of dependent colonies
or dependencies, to be governed arbitrarily by Congress with-
out the consent of the governed, or to erect any other govern-
ment than one founded on the immortal principles of liberty
and self-government, is presented to the sober, conservative
thought of this nation-to secure a departure from these deeply-
rooted, salutary and vital principles. This is more readily seen
when it is called to mind that the necessary amendments to our
Constitution which must be secured in order to inaugurate such
a colonial or provincial system, must receive the sanction and
approval of the Legislatures of three-fourths of all the states,
and the concurring vote of two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress.
I believe the time is far distant when we cannot find at least
twelve states of this Union ready and willing to say that the
principles of liberty and freedom under the banners of which
we have so successfully sailed the Ship of State so far, shall
still be our watchword in our future career as a nation.
For these reasons also, as well as those already presented, it
seems to me that Porto Rico and Cuba, already practically ours
by reason of the facts stated, and by reason also of an almost
universal present public sentiment, must inevitably, sooner or
later, be merged into our national life as a component part of
our Federal Union.
RESULTS OF OUR WAR WITH SPAIN.
If I may be permitted to express an opinion concerning this
probable consumation of the Porto Rican and Cuban question,
I do not hesitate to say, that considering their close proximity
to our territory, the fertility and abounding resources of their
soil, the unquestionable commercial and strategic advantages
appertaining to their ownership and control, the same will not
be an unmixed evil. They are, in effect, at our threshold, and
may well be appropriated and employed, amongst other things,
as available domestic guards to our extensive and unprotected
coast from the moftth of the Mississippi to the entrance of the
Potomac. At any rate, considering the fact that these islands
are now either actually ceded to us, or so situated that they
must speedly be so, we may as well make a virtue of the neces-
sity, and contemplate with serenity the advantages that will
accrue to us.
In view of the foregoing considerations, it becomes apparent
that in dealing with the subject of the Philippines and Ladrone
Islands, we must assume, at the outset, that whatever territory
we there acquire (other than possibly for a coaling or naval
supply station), must be acquired with the purpose of ultimately
utilizing it for the creation of additional states in our Federal
Union. As is said by Mr. John G. Carlisle in a recent article
written by him on "Our Future Policy," "The Philippine
Islands, with a population of eight or ten millions, must, unless
we are to violate the organic law of the land and hold apd
govern them perpetually as conquered provinces, be erected
within a reasonable time into several states, each with two Sen-
ators, and altogether having thirty or forty representatives."
If we acquire these islands, or any considerable portion of
them, we must, therefore, deliberately determine "to violate
the organic law of the land," undermine the foundation upon
which we have builded for over a century, and expose our
country to experiments at once revolutionary and dangerous;
or we must deliberately determine that it is a wise policy to
extend our present territorial state and federal system so as
ultimately to absorb these islands of the China Sea into our
Federal Union as states, upon an equal footing with all others.
No advocate of constitutional self-governmient; no believer
in the immortal principles of our Declaration of Independence,
in fact, no law abiding citizen ought to or can advocate the
first of these alternatives, and there are many unanswerable
reasons of policy rather than law, in my opinion, why the
second alternative, that of ultimate statehood, should not
prevail. E.LmEa B. ADAMS.
